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This paper explores the connection between three important threads of economic research offering
different approaches to studying the dynamics of an industry with heterogeneous firms. Finite models
of the form pioneered by Ericson and Pakes (1995) capture the dynamics of a finite number of heterogeneous
firms as they compete in an industry, and are typically analyzed using the concept of Markov perfect
equilibrium (MPE). Infinite models of the form pioneered by Hopenhayn (1992), on the other hand,
consider an infinite number of infinitesimal firms, and are typically analyzed using the concept of
stationary equilibrium (SE). A third approach uses oblivious equilibrium (OE), which maintains the
simplifying benefits of an infinite model but within the more realistic setting of a finite model. The
paper relates these three approaches. The main result of the paper provides conditions under which
SE of infinite models approximate MPE of finite models arbitrarily well in asymptotically large markets.
Our conditions require that the distribution of firm states in SE obeys a certain “light-tail” condition.
In a second set of results, we show that the set of OE of a finite model approaches the set of SE of
the infinite model in large markets under a similar light-tail condition.
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This paper explores the connection between three threads of economic research, each of which offers a
different approach to studying the dynamics of an industry with heterogeneous ﬁrms. One is based on
Ericson and Pakes (1995), which captures interactions among a ﬁnite number of individual ﬁrms as they
enter, compete in, and eventually exit an industry. We refer to such models as ﬁnite, as they explicitly
account for the evolution of a ﬁnite set of ﬁrms. While this is an attractive feature, the analysis of ﬁnite
models typically involves computation of Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) using dynamic programming
algorithms (see Doraszelski and Pakes (2007) for an excellent survey). Such analyses restrict the number
of ﬁrms to a small number because the computational requirements become unmanageable when there are
more than that.
A second approach, pioneered by Hopenhayn (1992), assumes that there are an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms,
each of which garners an inﬁnitesimal market share. Because of averaging effects across ﬁrms, these inﬁnite
models have stationary equilibria (SE) in which the aggregate industry state is constant over time. Such
equilibria can typically be analyzed and computed efﬁciently; the simpliﬁcation (relative to ﬁnite models)
arising from the fact that individual ﬁrms need not keep track of the industry state since it is constant.
A third approach, due to Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008), analyzes oblivious equilibria (OE)
in ﬁnite models. In OE, ﬁrms optimize assuming that the industry state is constant over time and equal to
its long-run expected value. As a result, OE shares the computational advantages of SE in inﬁnite models.
Additionally, as with MPE, the ﬁnite model setting of OE is useful because the model can more easily be
related to industry data such as the number of ﬁrms and the market shares of leading ﬁrms. On the other
hand, because the industry state is not truly constant in a ﬁnite model, OE represents only an approximation
to optimal fully informed MPE behavior in the model. OE has been developed only recently, but has already
seen wide use in applications.1
This paper explores the connection between the three approaches. One of the main goals of the paper is
to provide theoretical foundations for inﬁnite models, and justiﬁcation for their use. An important literature
on inﬁnite models has developed in macroeconomics, international trade, and industrial organization, study-
ing diverse dynamic phenomena such as the size distribution of ﬁrms (Luttmer 2007), the intra-industry
effects of international trade (Melitz 2003), R&D investments (Klette and Kortum 2004), ﬁrms’ techno-
logical learning (Mitchell 2000), and job turnover (Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993) to name a few. While
1For example, Xu (2008), Mukherjee and Kadiyali (2008), Qi (2008), Iacovone, Javorcik, Keller, and Tybout (2009), Thurk
(2009a) and Thurk (2009b) have used OE (or closely related equilibrium concepts) as a basis for their estimation methods and/or
counterfactual analysis in different applications.
1inﬁnite models have become increasingly popular, they are an idealization of real-world industries because
they assume an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms. To our knowledge, there is as yet no rigorous justiﬁcation in the
literature for their use.
We address this issue by providing conditions under which inﬁnite models give useful approximations
of dynamic behavior in large but ﬁnite industries. More precisely, our main result (in Section 5) provides
conditions under which stationary equilibria in inﬁnite models approximate ﬁnite model MPE for large
markets. Our conditions require that (1) the number of ﬁrms grows with the market size; and (2) that the
distribution of ﬁrms across ﬁrm states exhibits a “light-tail” condition that we deﬁne precisely. Under these
conditions one can justify use of an inﬁnite model as a tractable proxy of a ﬁnite model. An inﬁnite model
SE can be a poor approximation of a ﬁnite model MPE if either of these conditions is violated.
Previous work (Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy 2008) has already shown that OE approximate MPE
in large markets (under a similar light-tail condition as the one mentioned above). Thus, it remains to
describe the link between OE in ﬁnite models and SE in inﬁnite models. This link turns out to be very close.
First, SE can be understood as the OE of an inﬁnite model. Moreover, in Section 6 we show that, under
the appropriate light-tail condition and as the market size grows, the set of ﬁnite model OE approaches the
set of inﬁnite model SE in the following sense: (1) for large markets, every OE is close to an SE of the
inﬁnite model; and (2) all sequences of strategies that approach an SE of the inﬁnite model satisfy the OE
conditions asymptotically. Point (1) corresponds to the upper-hemicontinuity and point (2) is related to the
lower-hemicontinuity of the OE correspondence, respectively, at the point where the number of ﬁrms and
market size become inﬁnite. These results imply not only that OE and SE approximate MPE asymptotically
(under the light-tailed condition), but also that they essentially approximate the same subset of MPE.
The light-tail condition is important for both of our main results. In Section 5.5 we provide an example
of an inﬁnite model SE that is not light-tailed and that does not approximate MPE asymptotically. The
example illustrates that problems can arise when when the market being studied is dominated by a small
fraction of relatively large ﬁrms. In that case it is not appropriate to treat the industry state as constant
asymptotically since dominant ﬁrms can exert signiﬁcant inﬂuence on industry dynamics and therefore all
ﬁrms should factor dominant ﬁrm states into their decisions. Our light-tail condition rules out such situations
by ensuring that asymptotically large markets do not exhibit large concentration.
On the positive side, the light-tail condition is satisﬁed by many commonly used economic models. For
example, it is satisﬁed by a model with a logit demand system and ﬁrms competing Nash in prices in the
spot market if the average ﬁrm size is ﬁnite. Moreover, for many inﬁnite models (e.g., those that assume
monopolistic competition (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977)), the mere existence of an equilibrium with positive entry
2rates immediately implies the light-tail condition. In these cases, the use of an inﬁnite model as a tractable
proxy of a ﬁnite model is well justiﬁed.
Note that unlike the rest of our assumptions the light-tail condition is a condition on the equilibrium
distribution of ﬁrms, not a condition on the model primitives. We use it because it captures the core conver-
gence issue and therefore provides very general results. Moreover, the light-tail condition is quite useful in
practice because it is easy to check once an equilibrium to the model has been found.
A broad implication of our main result is that, for asymptotically large markets, a simple strategy that ig-
nores current market information can be close to optimal. In this sense, our results contribute to the vast and
classic literature on the convergence to competitive equilibria (Roberts and Postlewaite (1976), Novshek and
Sonnenschein (1978), Mas-Colell (1982), Mas-Colell (1983), Novshek and Sonnenschein (1983), Novshek
(1985), Allen and Hellwig (1986a), Allen and Hellwig (1986b), and Jones (1987)). Roughly speaking, these
papers establish conditions in different static models under which the set of oligopolistic Nash equilibria
approaches, in some sense, the set of (Walrasian) competitive equilibria as the size of individual ﬁrms (or
agents) becomes small relative to the size of the market. There are some notable differences with our work,
though. Our interests lie in approximating dynamic ﬁrm behavior in large markets, not in showing that
the product market is perfectly competitive in the limit. In particular, while the above papers study static
models, in which the main strategic decisions are usually prices or quantities, we study dynamic models,
in which the main decisions are, for example, investment, entry, and exit. Thus, while we show that ﬁrm
investment, entry, and exit strategies become simple in markets with many ﬁrms, we do not rule out that a
small fraction or even all ﬁrms may still have some degree of market power in the product market even in
the limit. Indeed, in the examples provided in the paper the limit product market is given by monopolistic
competition. Additionally, differently from the papers above, in our model the size of ﬁrms is endogenously
determined in equilibrium through investment. For that reason, we impose a light-tail condition that controls
for the appearance of dominant ﬁrms to obtain our asymptotic result.
Our analysis demonstrates that if the light-tail condition is not satisﬁed, a model that averages out id-
iosyncratic shocks can provide a poor approximation to industry dynamics. In this sense, our work is related
to Jovanovic (1987) and Gabaix (2008) that provide conditions for which idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations can gen-
erate aggregate shocks even in an economy with a large number of ﬁrms. In particular, Gabaix (2008) argues
that if the distribution of ﬁrm sizes is heavy-tailed, idiosyncratic shocks to large ﬁrms can lead to non-trivial
aggregate shocks. He empirically shows that the movements of the 100 largest ﬁrms in the US appear to
explain one third of variations in output.
Finally, there is a closely related paper by Adlakha, Johari, Weintraub, and Goldsmith (2010) that proves
3that SE approximates MPE asymptotically in a model with multidimensional ﬁrm states but in a different
setting. Their model does not include entry and exit and, instead of considering asymptotics in the market
size, they increase the number of agents directly.
2 A Model of an Industry with a Finite Number of Firms
The model in this section is close to Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008) which in turn is similar in
spirit to Ericson and Pakes (1995). An important difference, however, is that we consider multidimensional
ﬁrm states. Adlakha, Johari, Weintraub, and Goldsmith (2010) also consider this and other generalizations
in a model without entry and exit. In addition, we note that an important difference with Ericson and Pakes
(1995) is that our model includes only idiosyncratic shocks. This simpliﬁcation is important to relate our
ﬁnite model to an inﬁnite model.
2.1 Model and Notation
The industry evolves over discrete time periods and an inﬁnite horizon. We index time periods with non-
negative integers t 2 N (N = f0;1;2;:::g). All random variables are deﬁned on a probability space
(
;F;P) equipped with a ﬁltration fFt : t  0g. We adopt a convention of indexing by t variables that are
Ft-measurable.
Each ﬁrm that enters the industry is assigned a unique positive integer-valued index denoted by i. Firm
heterogeneity is reﬂected through ﬁrm states. A ﬁrm’s state is a multidimensional vector of characteristics
that affect the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, such as the quality levels of its products, productivity, capacity, or the size of its
consumer network. The state of ﬁrm i at time t is denoted by xit 2 X, where X  Nq, q  1.
Theindustrystatest representsacompletelistofallincumbentﬁrmsandthevalueoftheirstatevariables
at time t. Formally, we deﬁne st to be a vector over individual states that speciﬁes, for each individual state
x 2 X, the number of incumbent ﬁrms at state x in period t. At each time t 2 N, we denote the number of
incumbent ﬁrms as nt.
We deﬁne the state space S =
n




x2X s(x) < 1
o
. Though in principle there are a count-
ablenumberofindustrystates, wewillalsoconsideranextendedstatespaceS =
n




x2X s(x) < 1
o
that allows the number of ﬁrms at any state to be non-integer valued. This will be useful to deﬁne the inﬁnite
model and will allow us, for example, to consider derivatives of functions with respect to the industry state.
Note that an element of S deﬁnes a measure over X and an element of S deﬁnes a counting measure.
4For each incumbent ﬁrm i, we deﬁne s i;t 2 S to be the state of the competitors of ﬁrm i; that is,
s i;t(x) = st(x)   1 if xit = x, and s i;t(x) = st(x), otherwise. Similarly, n i;t denotes the number of
competitors of ﬁrm i.
In each period, each incumbent ﬁrm earns proﬁts m(xit;s i;t) that depend on its state xit and its
competitors’ state s i;t. Note that in most applied problems the proﬁt function would not be speciﬁed
directly, but would instead result from a deeper set of primitives that specify a demand function, a cost
function, and a static equilibrium concept. We make explicit the dependence of proﬁts on an important
parameter of the demand system that we focus on later; the size of the relevant market, denoted by m.
Proﬁts would typically increase with market size for a ﬁrm at a given state (x;s).
The model also allows for entry and exit. In each period, each incumbent ﬁrm i observes a positive
real-valued sell-off value it that is private information to the ﬁrm. If the sell-off value exceeds the value of
continuing in the industry then the ﬁrm may choose to exit, in which case it earns the sell-off value and then
ceases operations permanently.
If the ﬁrm instead decides to remain in the industry, then it can take an action to improve its individual
state. Let I  <
p
+ (p  1) be the multidimensional action space; for concreteness, we refer to this action as
an investment. If a ﬁrm invests it 2 I, then the ﬁrm’s state at time t + 1 is given by,
xi;t+1 = xit + w(xit;it;i;t+1);
where the function w captures the impact of investment and i;t+1 is a ﬁnite dimensional random vector
that reﬂects uncertainty in the outcome of investment. Uncertainty may arise, for example, due to the
risk associated with a research and development endeavor or a marketing campaign. The function w takes
values in Zq. This speciﬁcation is very general as w may take on either positive or negative values in any
of its components (e.g., allowing for positive depreciation). The investment cost is given by the function
d : I ! <+.
In each period new ﬁrms can enter the industry by paying a setup cost . Entrants do not earn proﬁts in
the period that they enter. They appear in the following period at state xe 2 X and can earn proﬁts thereafter.
The entry model is described more precisely below.
Each ﬁrm aims to maximize expected net present value. The interest rate is assumed to be positive and
constant over time, resulting in a constant discount factor of  2 (0;1) per time period.
In each period, events occur in the following order:
1. Each incumbent ﬁrms observes its sell-off value and then makes exit and investment decisions.
52. The number of entering ﬁrms is determined and each entrant pays an entry cost of .
3. Incumbent ﬁrms compete in the spot market and receive proﬁts.
4. Exiting ﬁrms exit and receive their sell-off values.
5. Investment outcomes are determined, new entrants enter, and the industry takes on a new state st+1.
2.2 Assumptions
We begin with some assumptions about the model primitives. Note that, relative to Weintraub, Benkard, and
Van Roy (2008), we weaken some assumptions in order to accommodate multidimensional ﬁrm states.
We ﬁrst make some natural assumptions about the proﬁt function.
Assumption 2.1. For each m 2 N, m satisﬁes the following:
1. For all x 2 X and s 2 S, m(x;s) > 0, and supx2X;s2S m(x;s) < 1.
2. For all x 2 X, the function lnm(x;:) : S ! <+ is continuously Fr´ echet differentiable. Hence, for
all x 2 X, y 2 X, and s 2 S, m(x;s) is continuously differentiable with respect to s(y). Further,
for any x 2 X, s 2 S, and h 2 S such that s + 
h 2 S for 


























We assume that proﬁts are positive and bounded (2.1.1). The last part of assumption 2.1 is technical and
requires that log-proﬁts are Fr´ echet differentiable. Note that this requires partial differentiability of the proﬁt
function with respect to each s(y). Proﬁt functions that are “smooth”, such as ones arising from random
utility demand models like the logit model, will satisfy this.
Next we make assumptions about the investment function and the distributions of the private shocks.
Assumption 2.2.
1. The random variables fitjt  0;i  1g are i.i.d. and have ﬁnite expectations and well-deﬁned
density functions with support <+.
2. The random vectors fitjt  0;i  1g are i.i.d. and independent of fitjt  0;i  1g.
3. There exists a positive constant w 2 N such that jjw(x;;)jj1  w, for all (x;;). The set I is
compact and convex.
4. For all x 2 X and y 2 fy 2 Zq : kyk1  1g, there exists  2 I, such that P[w(x;;i;t+1) = y] > 0.
65. For all x 2 X and y 2 Zq, P[w(x;;i;t+1) = y] is continuous in . The function d is continuous and
d(0) = 0.
6. For all competitors’ decisions and all terminal values, a ﬁrm’s one time-step ahead optimization
problem to determine its optimal investment has a unique solution.
As stated already above, we need to assume that investment and exit outcomes are idiosyncratic con-
ditional on the state (2.2.1 and 2.2.2), ruling out aggregate shocks. We require this assumption in order to
compare the model to the inﬁnite model.
We also place a ﬁnite (but possibly large) bound on how much a ﬁrm’s state can change in one period
(2.2.3), an assumption that seems weak. Assumption 2.2.4 ensures that the investment process is rich enough
to allow ﬁrms to move across the state space. Assumption 2.2.5 ensures that the impact of investment
on transition probabilities and the investment cost function are continuous. Finally, assumption 2.2.6 is a
generalization of the unique investment choice admissibility assumption in Doraszelski and Satterthwaite
(2010) that is used to guarantee existence of an equilibrium to the model in pure strategies. It is satisﬁed by
many of the commonly used speciﬁcations in the literature.
Weassumethattherearealargenumberofshort-livedpotentialentrantseachperiodwhoplayasymmet-
ric mixed entry strategy. In that case one can show that the number of actual entrants is well approximated
by the Poisson distribution (see Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008) for a derivation of this result).
Modeling the number of entrants as a Poisson random variable provides a realistic model of entry in mar-
kets with varying sizes, and also has the advantage that it leads to more elegant asymptotic results. We also
require that the entry and exit cost parameters be such that ﬁrms would not want to enter simply to collect
the exit value.
Assumption 2.3.
1. The number of ﬁrms entering during period t is a Poisson random variable that is conditionally
independent of fit;itjt  0;i  1g, conditioned on st.
2.  >   , where   is the expected net present value of entering the market, investing zero and earning
zero proﬁts each period, and then exiting at an optimal stopping time.
Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 are kept throughout the paper.
2.3 Equilibrium
We consider symmetric pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria (MPE). We denote ﬁrms’ investment strate-
gies as (xit;s i;t). Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008) show that in this model there always exists
an optimal exit strategy that takes the form of a cutoff rule (xit;s i;t) such that an incumbent ﬁrm i exits
at time t if and only if it  (xit;s i;t).
7To simplify some of the mathematical expressions, it helps to group the exit and investment strategies
together notationally. Let M denote the set of investment/exit strategies such that an element  2 M is a
pair of functions  = (;), where  : X S ! I is an investment strategy and  : X S ! <+ is an exit
strategy.
Similarly, we denote the expected number of ﬁrms entering at industry state st, by (st). This state-
dependent entry rate will be endogenously determined, and our solution concept will require that it satisﬁes
a zero expected proﬁt condition. We denote the set of entry rate functions by , where an element of  is a
function  : S ! <+.
We deﬁne the value function V (x;sj0;;) to be the expected net present value for a ﬁrm at state x
when its competitors’ state is s, given that its competitors each follows a common strategy  2 M, the entry
rate function is  2 , and the ﬁrm itself follows strategy 0 2 M. In particular,
V (x;sj0;;) = E0;;
" i X
k=t
k t (m(xik;s i;k)   d(ik)) + i ti;i

 xit = x;s i;t = s
#
;
where i is taken to be the index of a ﬁrm at state x at time t, i is a random variable representing the time at
which ﬁrm i exits the industry, and the subscripts of the expectation indicate the strategy followed by ﬁrm i,
the strategy followed by its competitors, and the entry rate function. In an abuse of notation, we will use the
shorthand, V (x;sj;)  V (x;sj;;), to refer to the expected discounted value of proﬁts when ﬁrm i
follows the same strategy  as its competitors. Note that in the notation we are suppressing the dependence
of V on m.
An equilibrium to our model comprises an investment/exit strategy  = (;) 2 M, and an entry rate
function  2  that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Incumbent ﬁrm strategies represent an MPE:
(2.1) sup
02M
V (x;sj0;;) = V (x;sj;) 8x 2 X; 8s 2 S:
2. At each state, either entrants have zero expected proﬁts or the entry rate is zero (or both):
P
s2S (s)(E; [V (xe;s i;t+1j;)jst = s]   ) = 0
E; [V (xe;s i;t+1j;)jst = s]     0 8s 2 S
(s)  0 8s 2 S:
Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008) show that the supremum in part 1 of the deﬁnition above can
8always be attained simultaneously for all x and s by a common strategy 0. They also discuss that existence
ofMPEcanbeestablishusingsimilarargumentstopreviouswork(likeDoraszelskiandSatterthwaite(2010)
and Escobar (2008)).
Dynamic programming algorithms can be used to optimize ﬁrm strategies, and equilibria to our model
can be computed via their iterative application. However, these algorithms require compute time and mem-
ory that grow proportionately with the number of relevant industry states, which is often intractable in
contexts of practical interest. This computational complexity has led researchers to explore models that are
simpler to analyze. One way to simplify the model is to assume that there are an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms.
3 A Model of an Industry with an Inﬁnite Number of Firms
In this section we formulate an inﬁnite model that represents an asymptotic regime within the ﬁnite model
where the number of ﬁrms and the market size become inﬁnite. The model we present is motivated by
and very close in spirit to that proposed by Hopenhayn (1992). However, there are some differences that
result from making the inﬁnite model comparable to the ﬁnite model presented above. We mention the
most signiﬁcant ones. First, in Hopenhayn’s model ﬁrms’ states are real-valued, but in our model they are
multidimensional vectors of positive integers. Note, however, that the key characteristic of a continuum
of ﬁrms, that there an inﬁnite number of inﬁnitesimal ﬁrms, is maintained. Second, Hopenhayn restricts
a-priori the set of feasible individual states to lie on a compact set (the interval [0;1]), whereas we do not.
Finally, in our model, ﬁrm investment decisions are endogenously determined, whereas Hopenhayn’s model
focusses on entry and exit and assumes ﬁrms’ trajectories follow exogenous Markov processes.
Because of averaging effects across ﬁrms, in an inﬁnite model the industry state evolves deterministi-
cally. Further, following Hopenhayn (1992), we propose an equilibrium concept in which the state of the
industry is constant over time, corresponding to the steady-state behavior of the industry. Together these two
things imply that each ﬁrm’s strategy in equilibrium depends only on its own individual state, alleviating the
curse of dimensionality. We now deﬁne the inﬁnite model.
3.1 Model and Notation
The inﬁnite model represents an asymptotic regime within the ﬁnite model above where the number of
ﬁrms and the market size become inﬁnite. In order to study this regime, we consider a sequence of markets
indexed by market sizes m 2 N. All other model primitives except the market size are assumed to remain
9constant within this sequence.
As in the ﬁnite model, ﬁrms’ states take on values in X, and the state st of the industry at each time t
is an element of S. Note that unlike the ﬁnite model, in the inﬁnite model, there is no need for a distinction
between the industry state and the state of the competitors of a speciﬁc ﬁrm. This is because there are an
inﬁnite number of ﬁrms so if one ﬁrm is removed from the industry, there is no change to the industry state.
Proﬁts in the inﬁnite model are deﬁned by the single-period proﬁt function 1 : X S ! <+. Relative
to the proﬁt function m of the ﬁnite model, the inﬁnite model’s proﬁt function is a limit: 1(x;s) =
limm!1 m(x;ms) (see Assumption 3.1 below for a rigorous deﬁnition). Note that in order to handle an
inﬁnite number of ﬁrms, we overload the notation so that st as an argument to 1 is interpreted not as a
counting measure, but as the number of ﬁrms at individual state x normalized by the market size m. In
the inﬁnite model, if st(x) is nonzero for some x, then there are an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms at individual
state x. For large markets, the product mst(x) is an approximation to the number of ﬁrms that would be
at individual state x. Similarly, in our inﬁnite model, an entry rate  is interpreted as the ratio between the
number of ﬁrms entering and the market size. The idea is that for a large market size m, the product m is an
approximation to the number of entering ﬁrms. These are the only two variables that we need to normalize
for the inﬁnite model. This overloaded notation is useful because it allows us to use the same deﬁnition of
equilibrium for both models (see Section 4).
Investmentandexitdecisionsaregeneratedbystrategiesandandentryiscontrolledbya(normalized)
entry rate function . The exit and investment processes are the same as in the ﬁnite model.
Because of averaging effects across ﬁrms, in the inﬁnite model the industry state evolves deterministi-
cally. It is possible to deﬁne industry state transitions and a value function over the state space X  S that
take this into account. However, to be consistent with past literature and because we are interested in the
long-run behavior of the industry, we instead deﬁne an equilibrium concept that assumes the industry state
reaches a steady state. First, we introduce assumptions over the sequence of proﬁt functions.
3.2 Assumptions
It will be helpful to decompose s according to s = n  f, where f is a vector representing the fraction of
ﬁrms in each state and n the total number of ﬁrms. Let S1 = ff 2 Sj
P
x2X f(x) = 1g. With some abuse
of notation, we deﬁne m(xit;f i;t;n i;t)  m(xit;n i;t  f i;t), where f i;t is a vector representing the
fraction of competitors of ﬁrm i in each state at time period t.
We require some assumptions about the sequence of proﬁt functions (indexed by m) in addition to
Assumption 2.1, which applies to individual proﬁt functions. The assumptions are discussed below.
10Assumption 3.1.
1. supx2X;s2S m(x;s) = O(m).2
2. There exists a non-negative real-valued function 1 such that, for all x 2 X, f 2 S1, c > 0, and all







1(x;cf) if limm n(m)=m = c 2 (0;1);
1 if limm n(m)=m = 0;
0 if limm n(m)=m = 1:
3. For all sequences n(m) satisfying liminfm!1 n(m)=m > 0, there exists constants d;e;k > 0, such
that m(x;f;n(m))  dkxkk












We ﬁrst assume (3.1.1) that proﬁts increase at most linearly with market size. This assumption should
hold for virtually any relevant class of proﬁt functions. It is satisﬁed, for example, if the total disposable
income of the consumer population grows linearly in market size.
Next we assume (3.1.2) that, if for a given normalized industry state, the number of ﬁrms grows pro-
portionally with the market size, then proﬁts converge to a non-negative number given by the limit proﬁt
function 1 as the market size grows to inﬁnity. Recall that 1 is the single-period proﬁt function of the
inﬁnite model. Hence, this assumption essentially deﬁnes the asymptotic regime for the inﬁnite model. If
the number of ﬁrms increases slower than the market size, proﬁts grow to inﬁnity; if the number of ﬁrms
increases faster than the market size, proﬁts converge to zero.
Assumption 3.1.3 imposes a condition over the growth rate of single-period proﬁts. It is used to simplify
several arguments involving dynamics. For example, it implies that expected discounted proﬁts remain
uniformly bounded over all market sizes when the number of ﬁrms and the market size grow to inﬁnity at
the same rate and that expected discounted proﬁts are ﬁnite in the limit model. Assumption 3.1.4 requires
that proﬁts are “smooth” with respect to the number of ﬁrms and, in particular, that the respective elasticity
is uniformly bounded.
We note that the limit proﬁt function 1 does not necessarily represent a static competitive equilibrium.
For example, it could represent a monopolistically competitive market. In fact, an example of a standard
economic model that satisﬁes these assumptions is a logit demand model where the spot market equilibrium
2In this notation, n(m) = O(h(m)) denotes limsupm
n(m)
h(m) < 1.
11is Nash in prices. In this case, the limit proﬁt function 1 corresponds to a logit model of monopolistic
competition (Besanko, Perry, and Spady 1990).3 In Section 5.6 we discuss this example in more detail.
Equilibrium in the inﬁnite model is deﬁned in the following section.
4 Oblivious Equilibrium
In this section we deﬁne a notion of oblivious equilibrium that applies to both the ﬁnite model and the inﬁnite
model. In the inﬁnite model, our deﬁnition of equilibrium will correspond with the standard deﬁnition of
stationary equilibrium (SE) used in the literature. In a ﬁnite model, our equilibrium deﬁnition corresponds
to the deﬁnition of oblivious equilibrium (OE) in Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008).
4.1 Notation
In the inﬁnite model, if the industry is in steady state then a ﬁrm’s optimal strategy will depend only on its
own individual state (and a single industry state). Similarly, in the ﬁnite model we can think about restricting
ﬁrm strategies to be functions only of the the ﬁrm’s individual state, even if the optimal Markov strategy
may not necessarily satisfy this restriction. Following Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008) we call
such restricted strategies oblivious. Let ~ M  M and ~    denote the set of oblivious strategies and the
set of oblivious entry rate functions. Since each strategy  = (;) 2 ~ M generates decisions (x;s) and
(x;s) that do not depend on s, with some abuse of notation, we will often drop the second argument and
write (x) and (x). Similarly, for an entry rate function  2 ~ , we will denote by  the real-valued entry
rate that persists for all industry states.
Suppose all ﬁrms use a common strategy  2 ~ M and the entry rate is  2 ~ . In the inﬁnite model,
though each ﬁrm evolves stochastically, the percentage of ﬁrms that transition from any given individual
state to another is deterministic. Similarly, the percentage of ﬁrms that exit is deterministic. Let P[xi;t+1 =
xjxi;t = y] be the probability that a ﬁrm in state y evolves to state x next period when using strategy . The
constant industry state ~ s; that represents the steady state satisﬁes the following balance equations:





y2X P[xi;t+1 = xjxi;t = y]~ s;(y) +  if x = xe;
P
y2X P[xi;t+1 = xjxi;t = y]~ s;(y) otherwise:
In the ﬁnite model, this equation can be interpreted as deﬁning the long-run expected industry state under
3More precisely, the standard logit model requires a modest and natural extension to allow for fractional states. Also, this
single-period proﬁt function satisﬁes the assumptions in the subset of industry states where it is strictly positive.
12strategies (;).
For an oblivious strategy  2 ~ M, an oblivious entry rate function  2 ~ , and market size m 2 N[f1g
we deﬁne an oblivious value function
~ V (m)(xj0;;) = E0
" i X
k=t
k t (m(xik; ~ s;)   d(ik)) + i ti;i

 xit = x
#
:
This value function should be interpreted as the expected net present value of a ﬁrm that is at individual state
x and follows oblivious strategy 0, under the assumption that its competitors’ state will be ~ s; for all time.
In the inﬁnite model this assumption is correct. In the ﬁnite model, it is approximately correct when there
are a large number of ﬁrms. Again, we abuse notation by using ~ V (m)(xj;)  ~ V (m)(xj;;) to refer to
the oblivious value function when ﬁrm i follows the same strategy  as its competitors.
4.2 Deﬁnition of Equilbrium
We deﬁne an oblivious equilibrium (OE) for market size m 2 N[f1g. A stationary equilibrium (SE) of our
inﬁnite model corresponds to an OE for m = 1. An oblivious equilibrium for market size m 2 N [ f1g
comprises an investment/exit strategy  = (;) 2 ~ M and an entry rate function  2 ~  that satisfy the
following conditions:
1. The industry state is constant and given by equations (4.1). The expected time each ﬁrm spends inside
the industry is ﬁnite:
P
x2X ~ s;(x) < 1:4
2. Firm strategies optimize an oblivious value function:
sup
02 ~ M
~ V (m)(xj0;;) = ~ V (m)(xj;); 8x 2 X:
3. The value of entry is zero or the entry rate is zero (or both):


 ~ V (m)(xej;)   

= 0
 ~ V (m)(xej;)     0
  0:
4Because there could be a countably inﬁnite number of individual states, the system of equations below may not have a unique
solution. If that is the case, we choose the minimum non-negative solution. The industry state ~ s;(x) =  ~ Tx, where ~ Tx is the
expected number of visits to state x under strategy  (Kemeny, Snell, and Knapp 1976). Also, note that under our assumptions, the
latter part of the condition is immediately satisﬁed for all m 2 N.
13Using the fact that expected discounted proﬁts are bounded (by Assumption 3.1) together with As-
sumption 2.2, it is possible to show that the supremum in part 2 of the deﬁnition can always be attained
simultaneously for all x by a common strategy 0, for all m 2 N [ f1g (see Puterman (1994)).
In some inﬁnite models there will not exist any SE with positive entry, i.e., such that  > 0. For
example, consider an industry where single-period proﬁts exhibit increasing returns to investment, so that
every incumbent ﬁrm has incentives to grow arbitrarily large (for a ﬁxed industry state). In this case, new
entrants might not be able to recover the entry cost (even if it is arbitrarily small), because they will need
to invest an arbitrarily large amount of resources to catch up with incumbents. Because we are interested
in situations where competition between incumbent ﬁrms is actually observed, we assume throughout the
paper that there always exists an SE with positive entry and focus on this case from here on.
5 Stationary Equilibrium Approximates MPE Asymptotically
Inﬁnite industry models are intended to approximate ﬁnite models with large numbers of ﬁrms. In this
section we formalize this notion. In particular, we establish that if a light-tail condition is satisﬁed, then
inﬁnite model SE offer close approximations to ﬁnite model MPE when markets are large. Note that we do
asymptotics in the market size and not the number of ﬁrms because, in our model, the number of ﬁrms is
endogenous.
We begin with some notation and a deﬁnition of the asymptotic Markov equilibrium property, which
formalizes the sense in which the approximation becomes exact. Next, we introduce the light-tail condition
and we prove the main result of the paper. Finally, we provide examples to illustrate some of the main ideas
behind the results.
5.1 Notation
We index functions and random quantities associated with market size m 2 N with a superscript (m). Let
V (m) represent the value function when the market size is m. The random vector s
(m)
t denotes the industry
state at time t when every ﬁrm uses strategy (m) and the entry rate is (m). We assume that the process
fs
(m)
t : t  0g is ergodic and admits a unique invariant distribution. In order to simplify our analysis,
we assume that the initial industry state s
(m)
0 is sampled from the invariant distribution. Hence, s
(m)
t is
a stationary process; s
(m)
t is distributed according to its invariant distribution for all t  0. Note that this
assumption does not affect long-run asymptotic results since for any initial condition the process approaches
14stationarity as time progresses. Let xs(m)  ~ s(m);(m) = E[s
(m)









t , where f
(m)
t is the random vector that represents the fraction of ﬁrms in each
state and n
(m)
t is the total number of ﬁrms, respectively. Similarly, let ~ f(m)  E[f
(m)
t ] denote the expected




x2X ~ s(m)(x) denote the expected number of ﬁrms.
It is easy to check that ~ f(m) = ~ s(m)
~ n(m).
5.2 Asymptotic Markov Equilibrium Property
Similarly to Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008), we deﬁne the following concept to formalize the
sense in which the approximation becomes exact.
Deﬁnition 5.1. A sequence f((m);(m))jm 2 Ng 2 M possesses the asymptotic Markov equilibrium














Recall that the process st is taken to be stationary, and therefore, this expectation does not depend on t.
The deﬁnition of AME assesses approximation error at each ﬁrm state x in terms of the amount by which
a ﬁrm at state x can increase its actual expected net present value by deviating from the strategy (m),
and instead following a best response strategy. Recall that an MPE requires that the expression in square
brackets equals zero for all states (x;s). The AME property instead considers the beneﬁt of deviating to an
optimal strategy starting from each ﬁrm state x, averaged over the invariant distribution of industry states.
If a sequence possesses the AME property, then, asymptotically ﬁrms make near-optimal decisions in states
that have signiﬁcant probability of occurrence. Hence, MPE strategies should be well-approximated in the
set of relevant states.
5.3 Light-Tail Condition
It turns out that even if the number of ﬁrms becomes inﬁnite along a sequence of oblivious strategies, that is
not enough to guarantee that the AME property will hold. If the market also tends to be concentrated along
the sequence, for example if the market is usually dominated by a small fraction of very large ﬁrms, then
the AME property may not hold. To ensure the AME property, we need to impose a “light-tail” condition
that rules out this kind of market concentration.
Note that
dlnm(y;f;n)
df(x) is the semi-elasticity of one period proﬁts with respect to the fraction of ﬁrms in









For each x, g(x) is the maximum rate of relative change of any ﬁrm’s single-period proﬁt that could result
from a small change in the fraction of ﬁrms at individual state x. If X is single-dimensional and a ﬁrm’s
state represents size, then since larger competitors tend to have greater inﬂuence on ﬁrm proﬁts, g(x) would
typically increase with x (and could be unbounded).
We introduce a light-tail condition that extends the condition of Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy
(2008)tomultdimensionalﬁrmstates. Considerasequenceofobliviousstrategiesandentryratesf((m);(m))jm 2
Ng. For each m, let ~ x(m)  ~ f(m), that is, ~ x(m) is a random vector with probability mass function ~ f(m).
The random vector ~ x(m) can be interpreted as the individual state of a ﬁrm that is randomly sampled from
among all incumbents when the industry state s
(m)
t is distributed according to its invariant distribution.






for all market sizes m 2 N.
The assumption ﬁrst requires that for all x the maximum rate of relative change of any ﬁrm’s single-
period proﬁt that could result from a small change in the fraction of ﬁrms at individual state x is ﬁnite. The
second part of the assumption controls for the appearance of “dominant ﬁrms”. To better understand this
part, consider the special case where there exists a random vector ~ x, such that, ~ x(m) = ~ x, for all m 2 N
(which will be the case in Theorem 5.1 for SE). In that case, the second part is equivalent to E [g(~ x)] < 1.
The assumption essentially requires that states where a small change in the fraction of ﬁrms has a large
impact on the proﬁts of other ﬁrms must have a small probability under the invariant distribution, so that
the expected impact of a randomly sampled incumbent is ﬁnite. In practice this typically means that very
large ﬁrms (and hence high concentration) rarely occur under the invariant distribution. We provide an
example in Section 5.6. Note also that if the set of individual states X is ﬁnite, then the light-tail condition
is immediately satisﬁed.
165.4 Main Result
Let  2 ~ M and  2 ~  be an SE. We want to show that the SE approximates MPE as the market size grows.
For these purposes, we deﬁne the following sequence of strategies and entry rate functions: (m) =  and
(m) = m, for all m 2 N. The strategies (m) are the same for all m and correspond to the SE strategy.
The entry rate (m) takes into account the interpretation of the entry rate in an inﬁnite industry model as the
ratio of entering ﬁrms to the market size. It is simple to show that with these strategies and entry rates, each
process fs
(m)
t : t  0g is ergodic and admits a unique invariant distribution for all m 2 N. Also note that,
because (m) = ; 8m 2 N, in this case ~ f(m) = ~ s;=
P
x2X ~ s;(x)  ~ f(1); 8m 2 N.
We now provide the main result of the paper. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 5.1. Under Assumptions 3.1 and 5.1, the sequence f((m);(m))jm 2 Ng possesses the AME
property.
Theorem 5.1 states that under the light-tail condition, an SE of the inﬁnite industry model approximates
MPE of the ﬁnite model asymptotically as the market size grows. In the SE of the inﬁnite industry model
it is assumed that the industry state is constant because there are an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms. However, in
an industry with a large but ﬁnite expected number of ﬁrms, the industry state is not constant. The light-tail
condition guarantees that in large markets, (1) the actual industry state is always close (in an appropriate
sense) to its average; and (2) that, therefore, movements around the average industry state have a small
impact on expected discounted proﬁts. The AME property can be established using these facts.
A signiﬁcant part of the proof follows a similar argument to the result in Weintraub, Benkard, and
Van Roy (2008) that establishes that, under the light-tail condition, a sequence of oblivious equilibria over
market sizes m 2 N possesses the AME property. However, that proof must be extended in two ways. First,
we extend it to deal with multidimensional ﬁrms’ states (see Theorem 6.1 and Appendix C). In addition,
because we are dealing with an SE (an OE for m = 1), an additional argument is required to complete the
proof. In particular, we need to show that expected discounted proﬁts evaluated at the long-run expected
industry state in market size m converge to expected discounted proﬁts for m = 1 as m grows.
Finally, note that the AME property is a statement about value functions. In addition, one can show that







= . Hence, entry rates at relevant states should also be
well approximated.
175.5 Example: Importance of Light-Tail Condition
To illustrate the importance of the light-tail assumption, in this section we outline an example for which
the SE is not light-tailed and which does not possess the AME property. The details of the example can be




That is, the state is single-dimensional and proﬁts depend only on the ﬁrst moment of the normalized indus-
try state. For the model considered, g(x) / x. In the appendix, we show that the SE (;) of the model is
heavy-tailed, that is,
P
x ~ f(1)(x)x = 1.
A key step in arguing that the AME property holds in the example would be to show using a law of large
numbers that the ﬁrst moment of the actual normalized industry state sampled according to the invariant
distribution converges to the ﬁrst moment of the expected normalized industry state as the market size
grows. If this is true then for large markets actual proﬁts are close to proﬁts evaluated at the average state.
Recall that the SE strategy is based on the latter.
We show that this step fails in the example. For market size m the ﬁrst moment of the actual normalized
industry state is well approximated by 1=m
Pm
i=1 xi, where xi’s are i.i.d. random variables sampled from
the long-run distribution of ﬁrm states in equilibrium ( ~ f(1)). The ﬁrst moment of the average normalized
industry state is E[xi]. Using standard results in probability we show that 1=m
Pm
i=1 xi   E[xi1[xi 
m]] ) Y as m ! 1 where Y is a random variable with a non-degenerate distribution (see Durrett (1996)).
Hence, the ﬁrst moment of the actual normalized industry state is not necessarily close to its average for
large markets; if the SE is heavy-tailed the uncertainty does not vanish in the limit. From this, we argue that
the AME property does not hold.
5.6 Example: Logit Demand System with Price Competition
In this section we illustrate the light-tail condition with an example. We consider an industry with differ-
entiated products, where each ﬁrm’s state variable is single-dimensional and represents the quality of its
product. There are m consumers in the market. In period t, consumer j receives utility uijt from consuming
the good produced by ﬁrm i given by:
uijt = 1 ln(xit + 1) + 2 ln(Y   pit) + ijt ; 8i 2; j = 1;:::;m;
where Y is the consumer’s income and pit is the price of the good produced by ﬁrm i. ijt are i.i.d. random
variables distributed Gumbel that represent unobserved characteristics for each consumer-good pair. There
18is also an outside good that provides consumers zero utility. We assume consumers buy at most one product
each period and that they choose the product that maximizes utility. Under these assumptions our demand
system is a classical logit model.
We assume that ﬁrms set prices in the spot market. If there is a constant marginal cost b, there is a unique
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, denoted p
t (Caplin and Nalebuff 1991). Expected proﬁts are given by:
m(xit;s i;t) = m(xit;s i;t;p
t)(p
it   b) 8i ;
where  represents the market share function from the logit model.
One can show that, if limm!1 n(m)=m = ~ c, then, for all x,
lim
m!1




y2N f(y)N(y; ~ p)
(~ p   b);
where ~ p = (Y +b2)=(1+2) and N(y;p) = (y+1)1(Y  p)2. The limit proﬁt function 1 corresponds
to a logit model of monopolistic competition (Besanko, Perry, and Spady 1990).
Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008) show that, in this model, the function g(x) takes a very simple
form, g(x) / x1. Therefore, the light-tail condition amounts to a simple condition on the equilibrium
distribution of ﬁrm states. Under our assumptions, such a condition is equivalent to a condition on the
equilibrium size distribution of ﬁrms. If 1  1 then the light-tail condition is satisﬁed if E [~ x] < 1, i.e., if
the average ﬁrm individual state is ﬁnite. This condition allows for relatively “fat-tailed” distributions. For
example, if the tail of ~ x decays like a log-normal distribution, then the condition is satisﬁed. On the other
hand, if the tail of ~ x decays like a Pareto distribution with parameter one, which does not have a ﬁnite ﬁrst
moment, then the condition would not be satisﬁed (like in the previous example).
It is interesting to note that in this example, for an SE with positive entry rate, (;), it must be that




~ f(1)(y)N(y; ~ p) = (Y   ~ p)2
X
y2N
~ f(1)(y)(y + 1)1 < 1 :





y2N ~ f(1)(y)y1 < 1, which is implied
by expression (5.1). Hence, for this model, the light-tail condition is immediately satisﬁed for SE with
positive entry rates. The same observation is also obtained in others models of monopolistic competition ` a
la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
196 Relationship Between SE and OE
In this section we explore more closely the connection between OE of ﬁnite models and SE of inﬁnite
models. As discussed in Section 3, an SE of the inﬁnite model is an OE of that model. In Section 5 we
showed that under a light-tail condition, inﬁnite model SE approximate MPE of ﬁnite models asymptotically
as the market size grows. Similarly, Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008) show that OE of ﬁnite models
approximate MPE asymptotically as the market size grows. We review and extend this result in Section 6.1.
In Sections 6.2 and 6.3 we further show that under the light-tail condition the set of OE of a ﬁnite
model approaches the set of SE of the inﬁnite model as the market size grows. Our results are related to
the upper-hemicontinuity and lower-hemicontinuity of the OE correspondence at the point where number of
ﬁrms and market size become inﬁnite. The results of this section imply that not only light-tailed OE and SE
approximate MPE asymptotically, but also that they essentially approximate the same subset of MPE.
6.1 Asymptotic Results for Oblivious Equilibria
Let ((m);(m)) denote an oblivious equilibrium for market size m. We consider the same notation as in
Section 5.1. Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008) show the following result for a specialized version of
our ﬁnite model in which individual states are single-dimensional; a similar proof with some changes that
we describe in Appendix C is valid for our more general model.
Theorem 6.1. Under Assumptions 3.1, and 5.1, the sequence f((m);(m))jm 2 Ng of oblivious equilibria
possesses the AME property.
The result is the analog to Theorem 5.1 for a sequence of OE in ﬁnite models.
Additionally, we prove the following result that we will use below. All proofs of this section can be
found in the appendix. First, we deﬁne kfk1;g =
P
x jf(x)jg(x). Note that if f 2 S1 and X is a random
vector with distribution f, then E[g(X)] = kfk1;g. Let A = ffjf 2 S1;kfk1;g < 1g be a normed space
endowed with the norm k  k1;g. If f 2 A, we say f is light-tailed. Let B = f ~ f(m)jm 2 Ng. Before stating
the result we strengthen the light-tail condition. The additional assumption implies that k  k1;g is indeed a
norm.
Assumption 6.1. There exists  > 0, such that for all individual states x 2 X, g(x) > . Assumption 5.1
holds.
Proposition 6.1. Suppose Assumptions 3.1, and 6.1 hold. Then,
201. The closure of B  A is compact. Hence, the sequence of expected normalized industry states,
f ~ f(m)jm 2 Ng, has a convergent subsequence to an element in A, that is, to a light-tailed distribution.
2. Asymptotically, the expected number of ﬁrms ~ n(m) and the OE entry rate ~ (m) grow proportionally
with the market size m.
3. The expected time inside the industry ~ T(m) remains uniformly bounded over all market sizes.
Proposition 6.1.1 establishes that in a light-tailed sequence of OE, f ~ f(m)jm 2 Ng has a subsequence that
converges to a light-tailed distribution. If the sequence of expected normalized industry states f ~ f(m)jm 2
Ng has a unique accumulation point, then it converges. Additionally, by the second part of the theorem, the
expected number of ﬁrms grows proportionally to the market size asymptotically. In the limit the resulting
market structure shares an important characteristic with the market structure assumed in an inﬁnite industry
model; in each individual state there will be an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms. These observations underscore the
close connection between ﬁnite model OE and inﬁnite model SE.
6.2 Upper-Hemicontinuity
In this section we show that if a sequence of OE satisﬁes the light-tail condition, then it converges to a
light-tailed inﬁnite model SE. The previous statement corresponds to the upper-hemicontinuity of the OE
correspondence at the point where number of ﬁrms and market size become inﬁnite, when the sequence of
OE satisﬁes the light-tail condition.
Recall that Proposition 6.1 states that if the light-tail condition is satisﬁed, then the sequence ~ f(m) is
contained in a compact set and that ~ n(m) grows proportionally to the market size. To simplify our analysis,
we will further assume that the sequences ~ f(m) and ~ n(m)=m for the OE that are being considered are “well-
behaved” in the sense that they have one accumulation point each.
Assumption 6.2. The sequences f ~ f(m)jm 2 Ng and f~ n(m)=mjm 2 Ng have one accumulation point each.
Assumption 6.2 together with Proposition 6.1 imply that both sequences converge. Let ~ f  limm ~ f(m)
(with convergence in the k  k1;g norm), and ~ c  limm ~ n(m)=m (note that ~ c > 0). Note that by Proposition
6.1, k ~ fk1;g < 1.
To state the next result we need one more assumption. Let T(m) be the random variable that represents
the time a ﬁrm spends inside industry m when using strategy (m). By deﬁnition, ~ T(m) = E[T(m)]. In
Proposition 6.1 we established that, under the light-tail condition, supm E[T(m)] < 1. For technical
reasons, we introduce a slightly stronger assumption.
21Assumption 6.3. The sequence of random variables fT(m)jm 2 Ng is uniformly integrable.
Note that if there exists 




< 1, then Assumption 6.3 holds. The
condition is slightly stronger than requiring uniformly bounded ﬁrst moments of ~ T(m).
We have the following result.
Theorem6.2. SupposeAssumptions3.1, 6.1, 6.2, and6.3hold. Then, thesequenceofOEf((m);(m))jm 2
Ng converges to a light-tailed inﬁnite model SE. Formally, there exists an inﬁnite model SE (;), such that,
for all x 2 X, limm (m)(x) = (x) and limm (m)=m = . Moreover, ~ s; = ~ c ~ f.
The light-tail assumption is useful to show the AME property because it guarantees that in large markets,
movements around the average industry state have a small impact on expected discounted proﬁts. Similarly,
the light-tail condition is key to obtain the continuity results in this section, because it guarantees that a
sequence of OE long-run expected industry states converges in a way such that small deviations from the
limit industry state have a small impact on proﬁts.
6.3 Lower-Hemicontinuity
In this section we show that all sequences of oblivious strategies that approach a light-tailed SE satisfy the
OE conditions asymptotically. This result is related to the lower-hemicontinuity of the OE correspondence
at the point where number of ﬁrms and market size become inﬁnite, when SE in the inﬁnite model satisﬁes
the light-tail condition. We begin with some deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 6.1. A sequence f((m);(m))jm 2 Ng 2 ~ M~  possesses the asymptotic oblivious equilibrium




~ V (m)(xj0;(m);(m))   ~ V (m)(xj(m);(m)) = 0 and
lim
m!1 ~ V (m)(xej(m);(m)) =  :
The AOE property requires that the OE conditions are satisﬁed asymptotically.
Deﬁnition6.2. Wesaythatthesequencef((m);(m))jm 2 Ng 2 ~ M~ convergestoanSE(;)ifforall
x 2 X, limm!1 (m)(x) = (x), limm!1 (m)=m = , limm!1 k ~ s(m);(m)=
P
x2X ~ s(m);(m)(x)  
~ s;=
P
x2X ~ s;(x) k1;g= 0, and limm!1
P
x2X ~ s(m);(m)(x)=m =
P
x2X ~ s;(x).
22The deﬁnition establishes a norm under which a sequence of oblivious strategies and entry rate functions
converges: strategies, entry rates, associated vector of expected fraction of ﬁrms, and expected number of
ﬁrms should converge in an appropriate sense. We have the following result.
Theorem 6.3. Suppose Assumption 3.1 holds. Suppose (;) is an inﬁnite model SE that satisﬁes Assump-
tion 6.1. Let f((m);(m))jm 2 Ng 2 ~ M ~  be a sequence of oblivious strategies and entry rate functions
that converges to (;). Then, ((m);(m)) possesses the AOE property.
The result establishes a weaker property than lower-hemicontinuity of the OE correspondence at the
point where number of ﬁrms and market size become inﬁnite, because we only require that the sequences
of strategies possess the AOE property (hence, that the OE conditions are satisﬁed asymptotically); we
do not require that they are sequences of OE. On the other hand, what is shown is stronger than lower-
hemicontuinity which would only require that there exists a sequence of OE that converges to the SE.
7 Conclusions
Inﬁnite models came into wide use because of their tractability, and because it was believed that they would
provideagoodapproximationtorealworldindustrieswithﬁnitenumbersofﬁrms. Inthispaperweprovided
foundations for this approach. In a fairly general setting we have shown that there is in fact a very close
relationship between SE in inﬁnite models, and MPE and OE in ﬁnite models. In large markets it therefore
should not matter which approach is taken.
There is, however, one important caveat to these results. If the equilibrium being analyzed is “light-
tailed”, then the inﬁnite model SE will be approximately the same as both MPE and OE for large markets.
However, as our example in section 5.5 shows, if the equilibrium being considered is instead heavy-tailed,
then the approximation may fail.
As mentioned above, the light-tail condition is a condition on equilibrium outcomes and not model
primitives. While it is useful in practice because it can be checked directly after an equilibrium has been
found, an interesting open question for future research would be to ﬁnd conditions over the model primitives
that guarantee that all SE are light-tailed.
Finally, note that the paper focuses on SE in inﬁnite models. We focus on this case because it is of
practical interest and has been extensively used in the literature. It seems likely, however, that the logic
of our results extend more generally, so that inﬁnite model equilibria approximate ﬁnite model MPE more
generally, not just for the stationary case. We leave this extension to future research.
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A Proof of Theorem 5.1
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Under Assumptions 3.1 and 5.1, the sequence f((m);(m))jm 2 Ng possesses the
AME property.
Proof. Let (m) be an optimal (non-oblivious) best response to ((m);(m)) in industry m; in particular,




^ V (m)(x;s) = V (m)(x;sj(m);(m);(m))   V (m)(x;sj(m);(m))  0:





^ V (m)(x;s) =





~ V (1)(xj;)   V (m)(x;sj(m);(m))

 A(m)(x;s) + B(m)(x;s):
To complete the proof, we will establish that E(m);(m)[A(m)(x;s
(m)
t )] converges to zero. An analogous
argument that we omit for brevity establishes that E(m);(m)[B(m)(x;s
(m)
t )] converges to zero as well.
Because  and  attain an SE, we have
sup
02M
~ V (1)(xj0;;) = sup
02 ~ M
~ V (1)(xj0;;) = ~ V (1)(xj;); 8x 2 X;
where the ﬁrst equation follows because there will always be an optimal oblivious strategy when optimizing
an oblivious value function even if we consider more general strategies.
Therefore,
~ V (1)(xj;)  E(m);(m);(m)
" i X
k=t
k t (1(xik; ~ s;)   d(ik)) + i ti;i

 xit = x;s i;t = s
#
 ~ V (m)(x;sj;) : (A.1)
Hence,

















Letting q(m) be the invariant distribution of s
(m)























 i;k)   m(xik; ~ s(m))j + jm(xik; ~ s(m))   1(xik; ~ s;)j:
Using Assumption 5.1 and following a similar argument to the extension of the result in Weintraub,
Benkard, and Van Roy (2008) to multidimensional ﬁrm states that establishes that, under the light-tail con-
dition, a sequence of oblivious equilibria possesses the AME property (see Proposition 6.1 and Appendix
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Note that ~ s(m) = m~ s;. Hence, by Assumptions 3.1.2, for all x 2 X, limm!1 jm(x; ~ s(m))  





k tjm(xik; ~ s(m))   1(xik; ~ s;)j







B Importance of Light-Tail Condition
In this appendix we discuss in detail the example mentioned in Section 5.5. To simplify the exposition of
the example we assume that investment decisions and entry rates are determined exogenously; only exit
decisions are determined endogenously in equilibrium. It is straightforward to construct similar examples
for which investment decision and entry rates are also derived endogenously in equilibrium.
Speciﬁcally, we consider the following version of our dynamic industry model:
 X = fx;x + 1;x + 2;:::g; where x is a positive integer.
 Investment decisions are exogenous. In particular, a ﬁrm in state x at time t that does not exit the
industry will transition to state x + 1 at time t + 1 for sure.
 Entry decisions are exogenous. In particular, each period there is an entry rate equal to  to individual
state x.
28 Exit decisions are determined endogenously in equilibrium. With out loss of generality, we assume
the distribution of the sell-off value it is uniform[0;1].






























z f(z)z = 1(butnotethat
P
z<m f(z)z < 1; 8m).
Note that 1 is only a function of the ﬁrms’ own individual state. We interpret 1 as the proﬁts each
incumbent ﬁrm garners from serving a different local market as a monopoly. 2
m is similar to a typical
proﬁt function derived from a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition, but where




z<m f(z)z (as oppose to just
P
z f(z)z).
The speciﬁc functional forms for 1 and 2
m are chosen for convenience in the example.
It is simple to show that m satisfy Assumptions 2.1 and 3.1, except for Assumption 3.1.2. However, it
is simple to modify m so that the latter assumption is also satisﬁed. For clarity of presentation, we do
not make that modiﬁcation. Also, note that for all c > 0, and for all f 2 S1, limm!1 2
m(x;f;cm) 
2
1(x;cf) = 0. Therefore, 1(x;cf) = 1(x).
We now show that the SE of this model does not satisfy the light-tail condition; we refer to the SE as
heavy-tailed. For the sequence of proﬁt functions deﬁned above, we have that g(x) / x. Therefore, if an
SE (;) is heavy-tailed, then
P
x ~ f(1)(x)x = 1. Recall that in our notation ~ f(1) = ~ s;=
P
x ~ s;(x).
Given single period proﬁts 1, it is simple to show using standard dynamic programming arguments
that under the optimal strategy, a ﬁrm in state x stays in the industry with probability (x=(x + 1))2. Given
these transitions, ~ s; can be derived recursively and is given by (see equation (4.1)):
~ s;(x) = 
~ s;(x + 1) = ~ s;(x)(x=(x + 1))2 = (x=(x + 1))2
~ s;(x + 2) = ~ s;(x + 1)((x + 1)=(x + 2))2 = (x=(x + 1))2((x + 1)=(x + 2))2 = (x=(x + 2))2
::::::
~ s;(x) = (x=x)2:
29Note that
P
x ~ s;(x) < 1, as required by the deﬁnition of SE. Also,
P
x ~ f(1)(x)x = 1, so the SE is
heavy-tailed.
We now show that the AME property does not hold for a particular speciﬁcation of the model. Recall
that f in 2
m is a a pre-determined pmf such that
P
































 i;k is distributed according to the invariant distribution of fs
(m)
t : t  0g, and xi are i.i.d. random
variables with pmf ~ f(1). The last approximation is valid for large m, because n
(m)
k is a Poisson random
variable with a mean that grows proportionally with m (see Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008)).
Taking the limit as m ! 1, using the continuous mapping theorem together with the bounded conver-






, where Y is a non-degenerate random variable. This is strictly positive. Hence, for all market
sizes m, there exists a set of states visited with a probability that is uniformly bounded away from zero
under the invariant distribution, for which 2
m is uniformly bounded away from zero over all market sizes.
On the other hand, 2
1(x; ~ s;) = 0. From these two arguments, we observe that the AME property does
not hold. An exit strategy that keeps track of the industry state and considers actual proﬁts will yield longer
times inside the industry (to garner proﬁts given by 2
m) compared to the SE exit strategy (that considers 2
1
that is always zero).
C Extension of AME Property for Sequence of OE
In this appendix we extend the result in Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008) for our model with
multidimensional ﬁrm states that establishes the AME property for a sequence of OE. The proof follows
similar steps to Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008). We only present the steps and results for which
the analysis differs signiﬁcantly from that paper.
Theorem 6.1. Under Assumptions 3.1, and 5.1, the sequence f((m);(m))jm 2 Ng of oblivious equilibria
possesses the AME property.
30Proof. We prove some preliminary results.
Lemma C.1. (Lemma A.5 in Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008)) For all x 2 X,
sup
m
~ V (m)(xj(m);(m)) < 1:
Proof. Assume for contradiction that supm ~ V (m)(xj(m);(m)) = 1. By Assumption 2.2.4, there is a
sequence of investment decisions that induces a strictly positive probability of reaching x from xe in a ﬁnite
number of periods, for all m. These decisions involve an investment cost that is uniformly bounded above
over all m. Therefore, supm ~ V (m)(xej(m);(m)) = 1, contradicting the zero proﬁt condition.
Lemma C.2. (Theorem 5.2 in Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008)) Suppose Assumptions 3.1 and
5.1 hold. Then, the sequence of expected number of ﬁrms ~ n(m) satisﬁes liminfm ~ n(m)=m > 0.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that liminfm ~ n(m)=m = 0. Hence, there is an increasing subsequence
mk such that limk ~ n(mk)=mk = 0. By Assumption 3.1.2, limk mk(x;f; ~ n(mk)) = 1, for all x 2 X and
f 2 S1. Now, for all m,




j ~ f(m)(x)   f(x)jg(x) + 
 2 max
fx2X:kxk1zg
g(x) +  < 1:
The ﬁrst inequality follows by equation (A.3) in Lemma A.6 in Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008).
The second follows by choosing z and  according to Assumption 5.1, and choosing f(x) = 0; 8x 2 X
such that kxk1 > z.
Hence, limm m(x; ~ f(m); ~ n(m)) = 1, contradicting Lemma C.1. It follows that liminfm ~ n(m)=m >
0.
Lemma C.3. (Lemma A.6 in Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008)) Suppose Assumptions 3.1 and
















31Proof. By Lemma C.2, liminfm ~ n(m)=m > 0. By Assumption 3.1.3, there exists d;e;k > 0, such that
m(x;f; ~ n(m))  dkxkk

























Proof of Theorem6.1. The rest ofthe proof is similar to Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008) withminor
modiﬁcations. We note one such modiﬁcation in the last set of inequalities in Lemma A.11. For the purpose
of this proof, we will assume that all expectations are conditioned on xi0 = x and s
(m)
 i;0  q(m), where q(m)
is the invariant distribution of fs
(m)




 i;t; ~ n(m))   m(xit; ~ s(m);(m))j. Let
Z
(m)
t denote the event kf
(m)
 i;t   ~ f(m)k1;g  , for  > 0. Recall that ((m);(m)) is an OE for market m.































d(kxk1 + tw)k + e

;
where the last inequality follows by a similar argument to Lemma C.3. P[Z
(m)
t ] is the same for all t and
converges to zero as m ! 1. The sum is ﬁnite, so the result follows.
D Proofs Section 6
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Suppose Assumptions 3.1, and 6.1 hold. Then,
1. The closure of B  A is compact. Hence, the sequence of expected normalized industry states,
f ~ f(m)jm 2 Ng, has a convergent subsequence to an element in A, that is, to a light-tailed distribution.
2. Asymptotically, the expected number of ﬁrms ~ n(m) and the OE entry rate ~ (m) grow proportionally
with the market size m.
3. The expected time inside the industry ~ T(m) remains uniformly bounded over all market sizes.
Proof. Part (1). It is simple to show that the space A is complete. Using Assumption 6.1, it is straightfor-
ward to prove that B is a totally bounded subset of A. Therefore, the closure of B is compact (Marsden
32and Hoffman 1993). The sequence f ~ f(m)jm 2 Ng has a convergent subsequence to an element in A by the
Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem.
Part (2). Lemma C.2 implies liminfm ~ n(m)=m > 0. Assumption 3.1.2 implies that if limm ~ n(m)=m =
1, then limm m(x;f; ~ n(m)) = 0, for all x 2 X and f 2 S1. In this case, it is possible to show that the OE
value function converges to zero as m ! 1 and ﬁrms cannot recover the entry cost. Therefore, it must be
that limsupm ~ n(m)=m < 1 and indeed ~ n(m) grows proportionally with the market size m. Additionally,
we know that ~ n(m) = ~ (m) ~ T(m). Hence, by part (3) of the theorem it must be that the OE entry rate also
grows proportionally with the market size m.
Part (3). Suppose, for the sake of a contradiction, that the expected time inside the industry ~ T(m)
does not remain uniformly bounded over all market sizes. Because under our assumptions, for all m,
~ T(m) < 1, this implies that limsupm!1 ~ T(m) = 1. We will prove that in this case, for all z 2 N,
limsupm!1
P
fx2X:kxk1>zg ~ f(m)(x) = 1. Since by the ﬁrst part of Assumption 6.1, there exists  > 0,
such that for all x 2 X, g(x) > , this contradicts the second part of Assumption 6.1 (light-tail assumption).
We deﬁne, for all x 2 X, ~ T
(m)
x as the expected number of visits a ﬁrm makes to state x when using





Lemma C.1 shows that for all x 2 X, supm ~ V (m)(xj(m);(m)) < 1. Recall that by Assumption
2.2.1, the sell-off value has support in <+. Hence, for all x 2 X, each time a ﬁrm visits state x, there is a
probability uniformly bounded away from zero over all market sizes, that the ﬁrm will exit the industry. The




We can write ~ f(m)(x) = ~ T
(m)













Because for all x 2 X, supm ~ T
(m)
x < 1 and, by assumption, limsupm!1 ~ T(m) = 1, it must be that, for




x = 1. Hence, forallz 2 N, limsupm
P
fx2X:kxk1>zg ~ f(m)(x) =
1, and the second part of Assumption 6.1 (light-tail assumption) is violated. Therefore, it must be that the
expected time inside the industry ~ T(m) remains uniformly bounded over all market sizes.
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Suppose Assumptions 3.1, 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 hold. Then, the sequence of OE
f((m);(m))jm 2 Ng converges to a light-tailed inﬁnite model SE. Formally, there exists an inﬁnite model
SE (;), such that, for all x 2 X, limm (m)(x) = (x) and limm (m)=m = . Morever, ~ s; = ~ c ~ f.
33Proof. We start by proving some preliminary lemmas.
Lemma D.1. Suppose Assumptions 3.1, 6.1, and 6.2 hold. Then, for all x 2 X, limm!1 m(x; ~ s(m)) =
1(x;~ c ~ f). Moreover, there exists d;e > 0 and k > 0, such that, 1(x;~ c ~ f)  dkxkk
1 + e, for all x 2 X.
Proof.
m(x; ~ s(m))   1(x;~ c ~ f) =





m(x; ~ f; ~ n(m))   1(x;~ c ~ f)

(D.1)
The second term trivially converges to zero by Assumptions 3.1.2 and 6.2, and Proposition 6.1. For the
ﬁrst term, consider that by Assumption 6.2 and Proposition 6.1, limm!1 k ~ f(m)   ~ f k1;g= 0. Then,
by Assumptions 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, and Lemma A.10 in Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008), it follows
that limm!1 m(x; ~ f(m); ~ n(m))=m(x; ~ f; ~ n(m)) = 1. By Assumption 3.1.3, supm m(x; ~ f; ~ n(m)) < 1.
Therefore, limm!1 m(x; ~ f(m); ~ n(m))   m(x; ~ f; ~ n(m)) = 0. That there exists d;e > 0 and k > 0, such
that, 1(x;~ c ~ f)  dkxkk
1 + e, for all x 2 X, follows directly from Assumption 3.1.3.
Now, we state that the oblivious equilibrium value function ~ V (m) and the oblivious equilibrium strategy
(m) converge to the optimal value function and optimal strategy, respectively, of a ﬁrm’s dynamic pro-
gramming problem with proﬁts given by 1(x;~ c ~ f). To abbreviate, with some abuse of notation, we let
~ V (m)(x)  ~ V (m)(xj(m);(m)). and, for all x 2 X, we let














Let ~ (1) 2 ~ M be the strategy that achieves the maximum above (the value function and optimal strategy
are well deﬁned by Assumption 2.2 and 3.1.3, and the results in Puterman (1994)). Hence, the value function
~ V (1) and the strategy ~ (1) are the optimal value function and optimal strategy, respectively, of a ﬁrm’s
dynamic programming problem with proﬁts given by 1(x;~ c ~ f).
Lemma D.2. Suppose Assumptions 3.1, 6.1, and 6.2 hold. Then, for all x 2 X, limm!1 ~ V (m)(x) =
~ V (1)(x), and limm!1 (m)(x) = ~ (1)(x).
Proof. We prove convergence of the value functions. The proof of convergence of the strategy functions is
analogous. The proof follows two main steps. First, we show that ~ V (m) lies on a compact set. Then, we
34prove that the limit of any convergent subsequence of ~ V (m) must be ~ V (1). This implies that, for all x 2 X,
limm!1 ~ V (m)(x) = ~ V (1)(x).
Lemma C.1 establishes that v(x)  supm ~ V (m)(x) < 1, for all x. Therefore, V (m)(x) 2 [0;v(x)], for
all m;x. By Tychonoff Theorem (Royden 1988), the product set x2X[0;v(x)] is compact in the topology
of pointwise convergence (or the product topology).
Suppose ~ V (mn) is a converging subsequence of ~ V (m). Let, for all x 2 X, ~ v(1)(x) be the (pointwise)
limit of ~ V (mn)(x). We prove that, for all x 2 X, ~ v(1)(x) = ~ V (1)(x). That is, the limit of any convergent
subsequence of ~ V (m) is ~ V (1). Let us deﬁne the following sequence of dynamic programming operators for
value functions V  v:






( d() + E; [V (xi;t+1)jxit = x;it = ])

 m(x; ~ s(m)) + QV (x) ; (D.2)
for all x 2 X. The operator F(1) is deﬁned as above, but with the proﬁt function 1(x;~ c ~ f).
Using Assumption 2.2, the operator Q can be written as:















 P[it < ] + E[it





for  < 1. It is simple to check that, by Assumption 2.2, the operator fx is continuous in the topology
of pointwise convergence. Hence, by Berge’s maximum theorem, the operator QV (x) is continuous in the
topology of pointwise convergence. Additionally, by Lemma D.1, for all x 2 X, limm m(x; ~ s(m)) =
1(x;~ c ~ f). Therefore, for all x 2 X, limn!1 F(mn)~ V (mn)(x) = F(1)~ v(1)(x). Additionally, ~ V (mn)
is the oblivious equilibrium value function, therefore, for all n 2 N, and for all x 2 X, it must solve
Bellman’s equation: F(mn)~ V (mn)(x) = ~ V (mn)(x) (because of Assumptions 2.1.1 and 2.2, and the results in
Bertsekas (2001)). We conclude that, for all x 2 X, F(1)~ v(1)(x) = ~ v(1)(x). Moreover, using the fact that
1(x;~ c ~ f) does not grow faster than a polynomial in kxk1 as x grows (by Lemma D.1) and Assumption
2.2.3, Theorem 6.10.4 in Puterman (1994) implies that ~ V (1) is the unique solution of F(1)v(x) = v(x),
for all x 2 X, among the set of functions with ﬁnite k  k1;w norm with w(x) = 1=(dkxkk
1 + e).5 Using a
5The sup weighted norm is deﬁned as kvk1;w = supx2X w(x)jv(x)j.
35similar argument to Lemma C.3, it is simple to show that v(1) has ﬁnite k  k1;w norm. Therefore, for all
x 2 X, ~ v(1)(x) = ~ V (1)(x). That is, the limit of any convergent subsequence of ~ V (m) must be ~ V (1). The
result follows.
We prove one ﬁnal lemma, about the expected time ﬁrms spend inside the industry. Like in the proof
of Proposition 6.1, we deﬁne, for all x 2 X, ~ T
(m)
x as the expected number of visits a ﬁrm makes to state x





we deﬁne ~ T
(1)
x and ~ T(1) as the expected number of visits a ﬁrm makes to state x and the expected time the
ﬁrm spends inside the industry, respectively, when using strategy ~ (1). In the next lemma, we show that the
expected number of visits to a state under oblivious equilibrium strategies (m) converges to the expected
number of visits under strategy ~ (1).
Lemma D.3. Suppose Assumptions 3.1, 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 hold. Then, for all x 2 X,
limm!1 ~ T
(m)
x = ~ T
(1)
x . Moreover, limm!1 ~ T(m) = ~ T(1) < 1.
Proof. First we prove that limm!1 ~ T
(m)
x = ~ T
(1)
x . Let Pt
(x;y) be the probability that a ﬁrm in state x will
be in state y, t time periods from now when using strategy . The expected number of visits to state x can












2.2 and Lemma D.2, it is simple to show that, for all t; x 2 X, limm!1 Pt
(m)(xe;x) = Pt
(1)(xe;x).
Clearly, for all t;m 2 N;x 2 X, Pt
(m)(xe;x)  P[T(m)  t]. If a ﬁrm is in state x after t time periods,
it must be inside the industry after t time periods. It is simple to show that Assumption 6.3 implies that
limT!1 supm
P
t>T P[T(m)  t] = 0. Therefore, limT!1 supm
P
t>T Pt






(1)(xe;x) = ~ T
(1)
x .
Now we prove that limm!1 ~ T(m) = ~ T(1) < 1. Provided the limit exists, ~ T(1) is ﬁnite, because




x and ~ f(m)(x) =
~ T
(m)
x =~ T(m). Assumption 6.1 implies limz!1 supm
P
fx2X:kxk1>zg ~ f(m)(x) = 0: This together with









~ T(1) < 1.
We use the previous lemmas to prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 6.2.
Lemmas D.1 and D.2 establish that, for all x 2 X, limm!1 (m)(x) = ~ (1)(x) and limm!1 ~ V (m)(x) =
~ V (1)(x). It is simple to observe that ~ n(m) = (m) ~ T(m). By Assumption 6.2, Proposition 6.1, and Lemma
36D.3, limm (m)=m = ~ c=~ T(1)  ~ (1). We prove that if (x)  ~ (1)(x), for all x 2 X, and   ~ (1),
then (;) constitute an inﬁnite model SE.
First, note that because limm ~ V (m)(xe) = ~ V (1)(xe) and ~ V (m) = =, for all m, it must be that
~ V (1)(xe) = =. Second, recall that the value function ~ V (1) and the strategy ~ (1) are the optimal value
function and optimal strategy, respectively, of a ﬁrm’s dynamic programming problem with proﬁts given by
1(x;~ c ~ f).
Therefore, to establish that (;) deﬁned above constitute an inﬁnite model SE it is enough to show
that ~ s; = ~ c ~ f. It is simple to observe that the vector ~ s; = (~ T
(1)
x )x2X = ~ c=~ T(1)  (~ T
(1)
x )x2X. By
Lemma D.3, ~ T
(1)
x = limm ~ T
(m)
x and ~ T(1) = limm ~ T(m). Because ~ f(m) = (~ T
(m)
x )x2X=~ T(m), we have that
~ f = (~ T
(1)
x )x2X=~ T(1). Hence, ~ s; = ~ c ~ f as needed.
Proof of Theorem 6.3. Suppose Assumption 3.1 holds. Suppose (;) is an inﬁnite model SE that satisﬁes
Assumption 6.1. Let f((m);(m))jm 2 Ng 2 ~ M  ~  be a sequence of oblivious strategies and entry rate
functions that converges to (;). Then, ((m);(m)) possesses the AOE property.
Proof. The argument in Lemma D.1 establishes that limm m(x; ~ s(m);(m)) = 1(x; ~ s;). Using a sim-
ilar argument to Lemma D.2 one can show that, for all x 2 X, limm!1 sup02 ~ M ~ V (m)(xj0;(m);(m)) =
~ V (1)(xj;). Similarly, since, for all x 2 X, limm!1 (m)(x) = (x), it follows that
limm!1 ~ V (m)(xj(m);(m)) = ~ V (1)(x;j;). Hence, forallx 2 X, limm!1 sup02 ~ M ~ V (m)(xj0;(m);(m)) 
~ V (m)(xj(m);(m)) = 0 and limm!1  ~ V (m)(xej(m);(m)) =  : Therefore, ((m);(m)) possesses the
AOE property.
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